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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/522,045	01/19/2005	Masashi Okamoto	10873.1576USWO	4002	
52835 HAMRE, SCE	7590 03/25/200 IUMANN, MUELLER	EXAM	EXAMINER		
P.O. BOX 2902			SHAW, AMANDA MARIE		
MINNEAPOL	IS, MN 55402-0902	ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER		
			1634		
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			03/25/2009	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/522,045	OKAMOTO ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
AMANDA SHAW	1634	

	AMANDA SHAW	1634				
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress			
THE REPLY FILED 02 March 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.						
The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following judaplication in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appe for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:     The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance FR 1.114. The reply must be filed	t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request			
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire te Examiner Note: the Dox 1 is checked, check either box (a) or ( MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(i)	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE ).	date of the final rejection FIRST REPLY WAS FI	on. LED WITHIN TWO			
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date whave been filled is the date for purposes of determining the period of a under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any perly received by the Office later may reduce any earned patient term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origi than three months after the mailing dat	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as			
<ol> <li>The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS</li> </ol>	sion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the				
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to (a) They raise new issues that would require further cor (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below	nsideration and/or search (see NO		cause			
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in better appeal; and/or      (d) They present additional claims without canceling a content of the co	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	, , , , , ,	ne issues for			
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).						
<ul> <li>4.  The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12</li> <li>5.  Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):</li> </ul>						
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).</li> <li>For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [</li> </ol>		•				
how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:			, plantation of			
Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:						
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE						
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>						
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary</li> </ol>	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appear and was not earlier presented. Se	and/or appellant fail ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1	s to provide a ).			
10. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER		•				
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.		condition for allowan	ce because:			
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)					
	/Carla Myers/ Primary Examiner, Art U	nit 1634				

Continuation of 11, does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Regarding the rejection made under 35 USC 112 2nd paragraph the Applicants argue that it is clear from the recited features that at the time the collecting solution is poured, the centrifugation tube includes the liquid phase part absorbed by the water absorbing particles and the microorganism or cell caught on the surface of the water absorbing resin particles. Therefore the Applicants submit that claim 1 is fully consistent and definite.

This argument has been fully considered but is not persuasive. In the instant case the claims recite the phrase "wherein the collecting solution is poured into the centrifugation tube without separating the liquid phase part absorbed by the water-absorbing resin particles from the water absorbing resin particles that have absorbed the liquid phase part." This recitation is confusing because it is unclear if there is actually a liquid phase in the centrifugation tube prior to adding the collection solution. The first step of the claims requires that the water absorbing resin particles absorb substantially all of the liquid phase interclear absorbing resin particles absorb asstantially all of the liquid phase in the centrifugation tube.

Regarding the rejection made under 35 USC 103 the Applicants respectfully submit that the rejection is relying on the improper use of hindsight in the interpretation of the references. The Applicants further argue that Sato is directed to separating only viruses whereas Wardlaw is directed to separating formed constituents in general. They further state that Sato is specifically intended to utilize particular types of particles that isolate viruses from other components in a sample which may adversely affect amplification. As such the use of hydrogel particles in amounts that would absorb all of the liquid in the sample as stugit by Wardlaw would in fact finitiate the purposes of Sato, as such use of the hydrogel particles would absorb all of the liquid components that may adversely affect the amplification reaction of the viral gene. They further argue that nothing in Sato teaches that the particles are deded in amounts that substantially absorb all of the liquid of the sample and that Sato is silent as to whether their hydrogel particles are even capable of absorbing water. They state that even if it was assumed that Satos hydrogel particles are capable of absorbing water. It is clear that more hydrogel particles would need to be added in order to absorb essentially all of the liquid of the sample and that Sato clearly notes that the addition of virus hinding particles in order gas quantity is undesirable. The Applicants further state that Wardlaw eaches away from the use of configuration and filter fragation and filter state that Wardlaw eaches away from the use of the sample and that Sato clearly notes that the addition of virus hinding particles in too large a quantity is undesirable. The Applicants further state that Wardlaw eaches away from the use of configuration and filter states that Wardlaw eaches away from the use of the sample and the Sato clearly notes that the addition of virus hinding particles in too large a quantity is undesirable. The

These arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. The previous office action acknowledges that Sato does not teach a method wherein the water absorbing particles absorb substantially all of the liquid in the liquid phase of a sample, however a 103 rejection was made and a secondary reference (Wardlaw) was used to cure this deficiency. Wardlaw teaches a method wherein it was desirable to use enough hydrogel so that essentially all of the liquid in a sample is absorbed (para 0011). Thus Wardlaw clearly teaches what is missing from Sato. The fact that Sato is concerned with separating only viruses whereas Wardlaw is directed to separating formed constituents is irrelevant because Wardlaw is only being relied upon for teaching a method wherein hydrogels are used to absorb all of the liquid in a sample. The Applicants argue that the use of hydrogels particles in amounts that would absorb all of the liquid in the sample as taught by Wardlaw would in fact frustrate the purposes of Sato however the Applicants have not provided any evidence that the particles would adsorb unwanted components. Further it is noted for the record that it is a property of any hydrogel that it is superabsorbent therefore it is a property of the hydrogel particles of Sato that they are capable of absorbing water. Further Sato away from adding additional particles. Sato merely states that in situations were there are small amounts of virus the use of too many particles results in low separation. One of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized that the number of particles required would depend on the absorbent properties of the hydrogel particles, the amount of liquid present in the sample, and the amount of virus suspected of being in the sample. based on this information one would be able to choose the appropriate number of particles to use. Further it is noted that the method of Wardlaw does not use a centrifuge or filter but again Wardlaw is only being relied upon for teachings hydrogels. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).